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THE END OF MEN OR THE REBIRTH OF CLASS? HOW HANNA ROSIN LEAVES 
OUT THE 1% AND FAMILY LAW FAILS THE OTHER 99% 
 
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article argues that much of what has been described as “the end of men” is in fact the 
recreation of class.  Greater inequality among men and among women has resurrected class differences 
and changed the way men and women relate to each other and channel resources to their children. While 
women have in fact gained ground in the workplace and acquired greater ability to live, work, play and 
raise children without men,  a mere relative move towards sex equality only masks the more fundamental 
changes occurring in American society and the continuing existence of patriarchy.. 
First, the improved freedom women enjoy does not translate into greater power at the top.  
Greater societal inequality has instead offset these changes by increasing elite male dominance, 
marginalizing women in the in the executive ranks and the most prestigious professional circles, and 
ceding political power to a conservative elite that has removed women’s issues from the public agenda.  
At the height of the era that supposedly marks the “end of men,” the gendered wage gap has been 
increasing for college graduates even as it declines for everyone else.  In a winner-takes-most world, the 
disproportionate rewards go to the alpha dogs who remain overwhelmingly male.   
Second, the genuine decline of working class men does not necessarily benefit women.  Instead, it 
means that an increasing number of women in middle American have little choice but to raise families on 
their own as the men in their lives become less reliable.   As society become more unequal, it writes off a 
greater percentage of men to imprisonment, chronic unemployment, substance abuse and mental 
instability.  The women left with low-paying but stable jobs at Walmart or Burger King have trouble 
finding partners who can either contribute enough to make the relationship worthwhile or who will assist 
the new female breadwinner who both brings home the bacon and cooks it.  These women have 
independence but neither power nor help at home. 
In short, over the past several decades, men have lost ground everywhere but the top, increasing 
male inequality; and, while women have gained in the middle and the bottom, they are not equal – 
anywhere -- because men retain “structural power” over women. Accordingly, we conclude that for the 
end of men to be a meaningful concept that describes a more egalitarian society, we must decrease 
economic inequality: the result would translate greater power for women into a better deal for men and 
greater investment in all children. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Imagine a society in which women are known through the region for their outspokenness 
and wit.  They have access to the same education as men.  They can own, inherit and manage 
property.  They enjoy a relatively greater degree of sexual freedom than in nearby societies.  
Would we celebrate the rise of women?  Herald the “end of men”?  If we learned that we had just 
read a description of Sparta, would we reinterpret the results?1  The sad truth is that the 
dominance of elite men can create conditions that look like the emancipation of women – and the 
end of the men on the losing end of steeply graduated male hierarchies.  It is nonetheless a 
mistake to conflate the relatively greater advantages women enjoy in such a society with female 
power.  Men – and male power – remain alive and well where it counts most, and that is at the 
top.  
 
In looking at the United States today, the big story is greater income inequality and the 
rise of a more dominant group of elite men.  Greater societal inequality disproportionately affects 
men.  In today’s society, it also interacts with economic changes – the rise of the information 
economy – that have changed women’s roles and remade family life.  Women have benefited 
from these changes.   The information economy rewards the more highly educated, and women 
now outnumber men at all levels of education.  The remaking of the household has freed women 
from labor intensive washing, cooking and cleaning obligations  and women have come to 
constitute almost one-half of the workforce.   The combination of an expanding service sector 
and the contraction of manufacturing places greater emphasis on interpersonal skills , and 
modern businesses reap greater benefit from  “softer” management styles.  Some have heralded 
the overall effect as women power; or, in the words of a spate of books and articles, beginning in 
2010, “the end of men.”2  They point out that women appear to be closing the income gap and 
more women than ever out earn their husbands.  The sexual revolution has eliminated much of 
the double standard.  Women have become so free to have children on their own that over half of 
births to women under thirty are non-marital.  Observers concluded that women are increasingly 
calling the shots and male power, influence, and earnings are in decline.   
 
We think these conclusions are – at least partially -- misleading and cloak the 
construction of a new class-based form of patriarchy.  Claims about the end of men are 
misleading for two interrelated reasons:  first, while women’s roles are changing and more 
women than ever are in college and the workplace, nonetheless, in the public sphere, in the 
worlds of political power and managerial power, and in the executive suites, women are losing 
ground.  Second, the change between men and women hides the greater inequality in society 
among men and among women.  The greater inequality among men has upped the stakes 
underlying mating and dating and has created a new elite.  The one percent receives deservedly 
disproportionate attention, but the men at the top -- at least ten percent -- have increased their 
                                                            
1 These descriptions come from MARCIA GUTTENTAG & PAUL F. SECORD, TOO MANY WOMEN?: THE SEX 
RATIO QUESTION 47 (1983). 
2 See, e.g., Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2010, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-end-of-men/8135/. See generally HANNA ROSIN, THE 
END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN (2012); LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX: HOW THE NEW MAJORITY OF 
FEMALE BREADWINNERS IS TRANSFORMING SEX, LOVE AND FAMILY (2012). 
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dominance as well.   Greater inequality increases the dominance of elite men, cedes political 
power to a conservative elite that has removed women’s issues from the agenda, worsens the 
income and status of non-elite men, and destabilizes families.  In short, over the past several 
decades, men have lost ground everywhere but the top, increasing male inequality; and, while 
women have gained in the middle and the bottom, they are not equal – anywhere -- because men 
retain “structural power” over women. 3 
 
The result of these "winner take all" changes that handsomely reward a narrow, 
increasingly male, elite while the rest of the country stagnates, is to increase the consequences of 
family investment.   For those who do not succeed in the new high stakes game -- the eighty 
percent, if not the 99 percent -- the result is likely to be downward mobility.  The figures on the 
"end of men" largely describe the middle managers and working class men at the losing end of 
these changes. 
 
The combination of the high stakes mating game at the top, family instability in the 
center, and female independence (with a fair amount of desperation) at the bottom is the 
recreation of the family as an engine driving class divergence.    Marriage once served to 
promote greater equality as executives married their secretaries, the mothers of young children 
overwhelmingly tended the home4, and men of all social classes worked similar hours.  Today, 
executives marry fellow executives, concentrating family investment in the elite of the next 
generation.  In the meantime, the “end of men” means that women in other social classes are 
increasingly giving up on the men who are on the losing end of the social transformations.  The 
consequence of the transformed marriage market has made marriage into an issue of class, so 
that only at higher incomes do traditional families thrive.  Evolving family norms implement and 
reinforce the new system.  At the top, the elite continues to raise their children within stable, 
planned two parent families, with women taking more responsibility for children and more likely 
to opt out of the highest career tracks.5  Below that, divorce rates are at all-time highs and non-
marital births are exploding.  These women neither have the option of opting out of work nor the 
ability to find family friendly workplaces that make it possible to do justice to their families. 
 
This is not the world that many people imagine when they fantasize about the end of 
men.  Instead, this world ironically owes more to the return of hierarchy among men than 
genuine societal power by women.    Accordingly, we conclude with recommendations for 
institutionalizing women’s equality that depend on decreasing economic inequality – the result 
would translate greater power for women into a better deal for men and greater investment in all 
children. 
 
I.  The Rise of Women or the Recreation of Class? 
The last half century has seen fundamental changes in the economy.  These changes 
increased the demand for the type of labor women have historically performed (think nurses and 
waitresses), decreased the premium for physical labor and long serving middle managers (think 
                                                            
3 See  GUTTENTAG  supra note 1, at  26 (1983). 
4 This was the pervasive model, albeit one never obtained by black women or poor women. 
5 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/.  
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men), and dramatically increased CEO pay, the wealth of the financial sector, and the value of 
executive stock options (think Jared Diamond, George Soros or Mitt Romney).6   The 
consequences are dramatically greater inequality, more opportunities for women than in eras in 
which they were systemically excluded from the labor market, and much greater dominance of 
the overwhelmingly male one percent.  These changes are having a dramatic effect on society 
and the family.   
The question is why call these effects the “end of men?”  We could just as well call them 
the rise of the elephant seals – economist Bob Franks’ description of what happens in a winner-
take-all community when the alpha males compete to see who can develop the largest tusks or 
Cayman Island accounts at the expense of the community as a whole.7   We believe that the rise 
of women needs to be placed in the context of increased male inequality.  If women ran the 
world, we suspect that the men on the losing end of today’s economic changes would be better 
off and women’s gains in education and income would be less remarkable.  Let’s give End of 
Men’s its due, however, and start with a picture of the changes in the status of women.   
A.  The Rise of Women? 
 
Women have made enormous strides in gaining access to higher education and the 
workplace.   Most of the change occurred during the seventies, the height of the women’s 
movement.  The birth of the information economy – with greater demand for women’s market 
labor -- set the stage.   The sex revolution and access to the pill and abortion helped.  Claudia 
Goldin and Lawrence Katz emphasized that in a few short years legal changes that made 
abortion legal and contraception available on college campuses had an immediate impact on the 
average age of marriage, overall fertility, and women’s ability to attend professional and 
graduate schools.8  Laws prohibiting sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and pregnancy 
discrimination helped secured women’s advances.  These changes, together with parallel changes 
in the economy that increased the demand for women’s labor, had an enormous impact on 
women’s workforce participation and earnings.  They were, however, largely complete by the 
mid-eighties.  Let’s look at the numbers.  
 
The percentage of college degrees awarded to women in 1970 was 42%; today it is 57%, 
a percentage that has been unchanged over the last decade.9  Women are much more likely to 
participate in the workforce in 2010 than in 1970 (although less likely than in 1980 – 56.8% in 
1970, 64.4% in 1980, and 63.3% in 2010).10   The overall wage gap between men and women 
has narrowed substantially from 1970, when women earned 59% of what men earned; today, 
                                                            
6 Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap is Higher on Wall Street Than Anywhere Else, March 19, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender-wage-gap-wall-street_n_1362878.html.   
7 ROBERT H. FRANK, THE DARWIN ECONOMY: LIBERTY, COMPETITION, AND THE COMMON GOOD (2011). 
 
8 Goldin, Claudia & Katz, L. F. (2002). The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and 
Marriage Decisions, 110 J.. POL. ECON.,730..  
9 Susan Aud et al., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012 259 tbl.A-38-1 (Thomas Nachazel et al. eds., 
2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf.  
10 U.S. Census Bureau, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 384 tbl.597 (2012), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/labor.pdf.  
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women earn 77% of what men earn (although the biggest gains occurred before 1980).11  And 
yes, while wives’ earnings contributed 26.6% of total family income in 1970, they contribute 
37.1% today, an increase of more than one-third.12  Similarly, the number of married couples in 
which both husband and wife are wage-earners has increased substantially as well, from 45.7% 
in 1970 to 55.3% ; the number of families in which the husband is the sole wage earner has 
decreased almost 50% (from 33.3% in 1970 to 18% today), while the number of families in 
which the wife is the sole wage-earner has more than tripled, albeit from an almost insignificant 
1.9% in 1970 to a still small 6.6% today.13   Women have in fact gained in education, income, 
and status.  Before we celebrate too much, however, let’s consider who the really big winners 
have been. 
 
B.  Income Inequality and Elite Male Dominance 
 
Over the last twenty years, the single biggest change in the U.S. economy has been the 
increase in income inequality.   The inequality in wages is the highest it has been in a century.14  
Between 1980 and 2005, the United States enjoyed considerable growth and productivity gains, 
but 80 percent of the increase in income went to the top one percent of U. S. earners.15   Those at 
the very top, the 99.99th percentile, increased their income between 1985 and 2005 by a factor of 
5 (amounting to an increase of over $4 million of year), while those below the 99.00th percentile 
showed relatively modest gains, and income stagnated for those below the top quintile.16   
Putting the overall picture together, Congressional budget office figures show that the highest 
fifth increased their after-tax earnings by 95 percent between 1979 and 2007 in comparison with 
a 25 percent increase in middle fifth of households and a sixteen percent increase for the bottom 
fifth.   
Now, let’s consider the gender breakdown underlying these figures, beginning with the 
professions.  Women have dramatically increased their representations among doctors and 
lawyers, and the most highly paid professionals have increased their incomes substantially.  Yet, 
women have also lost ground in recent years.  Women constitute slightly less than one-third of 
all physicians and surgeons, and earn 71% of what men earn.17  Indeed, the gender gap has 
widened for starting salaries, rising from a difference of $3,600 in 1999 to $16,819 in 2008.18 
Researchers conclude that the gap cannot be explained by specialty choice, practice setting, work 
hours, or other characteristics.  In law, the differences are smaller, but the percentage of women 
                                                            
11 Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 2012 EDITION 3 fig.1 
(2012), available at http://www.aauw.org/learn/research/upload/simpletruthaboutpaygap1.pdf 
12 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 77 tbl.24 
(2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2011.pdf.  
13  Id. at 76 tbl.23.  
14 Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence/features/2010/the_united_states_of_inequalit
y/introducing_the_great_divergence.html. 
15 Id. 
16 Bartels, supra, at 10-11. 
17 Id. at 58.  
18 Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Michael R. Richards, Chiu-Fang Chou & Susan E. Gerber, The $16,819 Pay Gap 
for Newly Trained Physicians: The Unexplained Trend of Men Earning More Than Women, 30 HEALTH AFF. 193 
(2011). 
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in law school peaked in 2001 and has been declining since then.  With the decline in graduates, 
the pipeline into law firms has been also been declining modestly over the last ten years.  
Women continue to hold about 15% of equity partnerships, the most lucrative positions in the 
legal profession and that figure has been largely unchanged for twenty years.19  Firms, however, 
have also moved toward different compensation tiers, and women do not fare as well in the new 
systems as they did in firms with a single partnership level.20    
Further exacerbating the exclusion of women from the top income ranks is the change in 
the financial sector – the sector of the economy whose income grew most rapidly over the last 
twenty years.21  The six jobs with the largest gender gap in pay and at least 10,000 men and 
10,000 women were in the Wall Street-heavy financial sector: insurance agents, managers, 
clerks, securities sales agents, personal advisers and other specialists.22  Moreover, while the 
percentage of women in business schools has increased to almost half, the number of women on 
Wall Street has dropped off since 2000.  In 2008 and 2009, the number of sexual harassment 
charges per woman in the financial industry grew higher.23 Total compensation for executives 
tripled over the last fifteen years,24  with the ratio of CEO compensation to average worker pay 
increasing by at least a factor of ten.25  Yet, according to a 2010 report, women constitute only 2 
percent of chief executive officers (CEOs), 14 percent of top executives, and 16 percent of 
directors at Fortune 500 companies26  Women are losing out in the sectors of the economy where 
compensation was most rapidly increasing. 
 
In the highly lucrative tech sector, the overall percentage of women has been falling.  Ten 
years ago, women earned 28.1% of all computer and information sciences bachelor’s degrees; 
today, they earn 18.1%.27  Or take engineering, where 18.6% of the degrees were awarded to 
women a decade ago, but only 16.8% were awarded more recently28 (a small decrease, but a 
                                                            
 19 The Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers & The Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers Found., REPORT OF THE 
SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3 (2011), available 
at 
http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NAWL%202011%20Annual%20Survey%20Report%20FINAL%20Publ
ication-ready%2011-9-11.pdf.  
20 Id.at 5.  
21 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 62 (2011). 
22 Frank Bass, Shining Shoes Best Way Wall Street Women Outearn Men, BLOOMBERG (March 16, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-16/shining-shoes-best-way-wall-street-women-outearn-men.html. 
23 Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap Is Higher On Wall Street Than Anywhere Else, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender-wage-gap-wall-street_n_1362878.html. 
24  Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 49, 51 (2003) 
(reporting and discussing executive option grants). 
25 Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein & Sylvia Allegretto, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007, 
(2007), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=books; see 
also Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View From a Long-Term Perspective, 
1936-2005, Fed. Reserve Bd. Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Aff. Finance & Economics Discussion 
Series, Working Paper No. 2007-35, July 6, 2007), available 
at http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200735/200735abs.html (growth of CEO pay relative to worker pay 
increased from 30:1 in 1970 to 120:1 by 2000).  
26 Rachel Soares, Jan Combopiano, Allyson Regis, Yelena Shur & Rosita Wong, 2010 CATALYST CENSUS: 
FORTUNE 500 WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND TOP EARNERS, CATALYST.ORG (2010), 
http://catalyst.org/file/412/2010_us_census_women_executive_officers_and_top_earners_final.pdf.  
27 Aud, supra note 9, at 259 tbl.A-38-1.  
28 Id. 
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decrease nonetheless).  Even though women graduate from college in greater numbers than men, 
they have lost ground in gaining entry to the most remunerative degrees and positions. 
 
C. Gender and the Recreation of Class 
 
In light of these changes, let’s revisit the statistics that show women’s gains vis-à-vis 
men.  Like other statistics, they show dramatic variation by class and race.  We start with college 
graduation rates, where women now outperform the men.  Break down these figures by race and 
income, however, and we see a different story.   Among whites with family incomes above 
$70,000 per year, the percentage of males versus females attending college dropped from 52 to 
49% from the mid-nineties to 2003-04.  At 49-51, however, the number of men and women 
attending college is almost the same.  The more significant drop in male college attendance came 
in the middle income ranks ($30,000 to 70,000) where the percentage of men fell from 50 to 
43% and the low income group where it fell to 42%.     For African-Americans, the percentage of 
men in the top group increased during the same period, reaching 48%, almost indistinguishable 
from the white rate.  Elite Latinos showed patterns similar to whites.  Middle income African-
Americans and Latinos, however, reported that only 42% of their college students in the middle 
income group were male, and for the low-income students in 2003-04, only 36% of the blacks 
and 39% of the Latinos were male.  In other words, as the economy has weakened, the big fall 
off has been in the college attendance of low income men.   The men from elite families, 
whatever their race, are still in college.29 
 
Let’s turn to the much heralded change in the wage gap.  In the seventies and eighties, the 
gender wage gap narrowed and did so overwhelmingly because of increases in income to highly 
skilled women.30  Comparing 1990 with 2007, however, the figures diverge strikingly by 
education.   Looking at gross figures, that is, the percentage of men’s median income earned by 
women without controlling for any characteristic other than education, the wage gap over the last 
twenty years narrowed the most for the least educated women while the gap between men and 
women increased for the most educated: 
 
Female Median Income as a Percentage of Male Median Income by Education31 
 
 
                                                            
29 Mary Beth Marklein, College Gender Gaps Widens: 57% are Women, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2005, 
11:41 p.m.), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2005-10-19-male-college-cover_x.htm 
30 Francine Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing Convergence 17 
(Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 508, March 1, 2006), 
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01gb19f581g (finding that wage gains for married women in the 1970s and 
1980s tended to be greatest for women married to middle and high wage men). 
31 Median Annual Income, by Level of Education, 1990-2008, INFOPLEASE (2007), 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883617.html#ixzz1JFxpOxL9 (last visited OctNov. 17,1, 2011). 
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Exacerbating the loss of blue collar male status was a change in employment stability.   
The length the average man or women stays in a particular job has diminished substantially over 
the last thirty years, but the impact has been substantially greater for the working class.36   In the 
1970’s, the differences in job stability did not vary much by education.  After 2000, the job 
instability figures for the most educated remained about the same as the figures for the seventies.  
But they increased by a third for the other males. 37       
The disappearance of “good jobs” with decent pay, increasing benefits over time, and 
employment stability has had a significant impact on blue collar men.  At the height of the Great 
Compression, the period of relative income equality between 1945 and the mid-seventies, male 
leisure time did not vary much by class; today, it does.38  Charles Murray documents the changes 
in employment since1960 in a prototypical white upper class community (Belmont) and a 
prototypical white working class town (Fishtown).  In the middle of the twentieth century, the 
number of men who worked less than forty hours a week was low – about 10 percent in Fishtown, 
the working class community, and 8 percent in Belmont, the more affluent area.  By 2010, the 
percentage of men working less than forty hours a week had doubled in Fishtown to 20 percent 
while rising more modestly to about 12 percent in Belmont.39  The figures are higher still in 
African-American communities and have been since good blue collar jobs began to disappear in 
the sixties. 
Nor do the employment figures alone capture the impact on working class communities.  A 
remarkable book, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger, suggests that 
greater inequality itself makes matter worse.  Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett present a cross-
cultural study that examines the impact of greater inequality across different countries and 
different states in the United States.  Their 2009 study found that income inequality had a greater 
impact on societies than poverty rates and that greater inequality lowered levels of trust, 
educational achievement and social mobility and increased rates of mental illness (including 
substance abuse), obesity, teenage births, homicides and imprisonment rates.40    
Greater inequality has had a disproportionate impact on the lives of low and middle 
income men and that, much more than women’s gains, may account for much of the “end of men.”   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
contribute.  Id. at 16.  In addition, the less education a woman has the less likely she is to be in the labor market. 
Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 
DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608 (2004). When looking at a husband’s education, however, the figures even out, with college 
educated men being the least likely to have a working spouse. Fry & Cohn, supra note 34, at 16.   
36 See Henry Farber, Is the Company Man an Anachronism? Trends in Long Term Employment in the U.S., 
1973-2006 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 518, Sept. 11, 2007), 
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01ft848q61h. 
37 For a broader discussion of these trends, see Arne L. Kalleberg, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF 
POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S-2000S (2011). He observed that 
aggregate figures sometimes show relatively little change in job stability in the United States, but the averages cloak 
important differences as employment instability has increased for: men, but not women; high-school graduates and 
dropouts, but not the college-educated; blacks more than whites; and some age groups more than others. Id. at 93. 
38 Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who are the Overworked Americans?, 56 REV. SOC. ECON. 442, 457 
(1998). 
39 CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010 176 (2012).   
40 RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES 
STRONGER 19 (2011). 
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II.  The Family  
The second, much more complicated, part of the “End of Men,” has been the impact on 
the family.   Women have indubitably gained power in family matters and perhaps the most 
important component of their increased power is the ability to leave unhappy relationships.41  
Women’s greater economic independence means that they no longer need to rely on a 
breadwinning male to provide financial support, and divorce reform streamlined the ease of 
breakups, reinforcing equal parenting and economic sharing.42  The result has increased women’s 
influence inside and outside of relationships.   Economists Betsey Stephenson and Justin Wolfers 
report, for example, that divorce reform is associated with a thirty percent decline in domestic 
violence and a significant drop in women’s suicide rates.43 
While the gain in women’s ability to make it on their own is substantial, women’s ability 
to enter into relationships of their choosing is far more mixed.   In an influential book in the 
eighties, sociologists Marcia Guttentag and Paul Secord explored the relationship between what 
they termed “structural” or societal power and “dyadic” power or power to choose 
relationships.44   Ordinarily, the ratio of men to women determines dyadic power.  If men 
outnumber women in a community, for example, the women would gain greater ability to 
determine the terms of relationships.  Yet, their ability to do so might depend on the power they 
held within society.   In the United States in the nineteenth century, male Chinese immigrants 
outnumbered the females by 20-1 at a time when the states forbade interracial marriages.45   The 
few Asian women in the country, if able to fend for themselves, could have had their choice of 
suitors.  Yet, the women, who were immensely valuable to whoever controlled sexual access to 
them, had very little individual power.  They were often forced into prostitution and forbidden to 
marry. 46    Their lack of societal power meant that the women could not realize the benefits from 
their increase in intimate or “dyadic” power. 
In the United States, the relationship between structural power and dyadic power varies 
by class.  At the top, high income men have increased their structural power, but still outnumber 
high income women.  At the bottom, marriageable women substantially outnumber marriageable 
men and have since good blue collar jobs first began to disappear.  Rosin’s stories are most 
persuasive in describing the change in the relationship between men and women in the middle.  
She describes women in a small town in Alabama who keep their families afloat after the town’s 
principal employer closed the factory that once employed a sizeable percentage of the town’s 
men.  What she doesn’t say is that this is one of the groups who have seen the greatest increase 
in divorce rates.  She also describes younger couples in a coastal Virginia community.  The 
women are the go-getters, the men the slackers.  Young couples have children without marrying, 
most often because the mothers see little point in tying family well-being too closely to 
unreliable men.  Rosin opens one of the chapters with a description of Calvin and Bethany, who 
                                                            
41 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989) (discussing the importance of the 
ability to exit). 
42 On the role of the law in supporting women’s equality and a new family model, See JUNE CARBONE & 
NAOMI CAHN, FAMILY CLASSES (forthcoming 2013). 
43 Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family 
Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 267-288 (2006). 
44 GUTTENTAG & SECORD, supra note 1, at 24-27. 
45 Id. at 29. 
46 Id. at 30. 
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have had a child together.  Marriage is not part of the picture.  Bethany explains, “But Calvin 
would just mean one less granola bar for the two of us.”47  In these communities, women have 
gained in influence while the men’s income and status have fallen.  
If we treat the search for the right mate as a market, women at the top have gained the 
most in terms of the changes in supply and demand.  The supply of elite men has increased and 
with it the demand for women with high income and education.  In another era, the best educated 
women were less likely to marry than the average women.  Today, those with the most education 
and the highest incomes are the most likely to be married and to be married in stable 
relationships that include two incomes and flexible gender roles.   Farther down the socio-
economic ladder in contrast, marriage is rapidly disappearing in large part because the women 
have outpaced the men.  And while Rosin paints a cheery picture of single mothers preferring to 
make it on their own, their children are falling farther behind the children in two-parent families 
whose combined resources offer greater advantages.48  The class-based changes in family 
structure reinforce class-based inequality.  Write off a high percentage of men as effectively 
unmarriageable, and women tend to give up on men – and marriage – more generally.  The result 
once again may or may not be “the end of blue collar men,” but it is definitely the recreation of 
class. 
 A. Remade Marriages at the Top: The True Feminist Triumph 
 
 In the United States today, marriage and dating markets increasingly reflect class.  We 
have argued elsewhere that the college educated middle class has adopted a new family strategy: 
invest in both men and women’s earning power and delay marriage until the point of emotional 
maturity and financial independence.49  Both the delay in marriage and the increase in women’s 
earning capacity have made it more likely that the well-off will marry each other.50  UCLA 
researchers specifically tested the effect of the age of marriage and found that the likelihood that 
similarly educated adults will marry each other increases with later marriage.51  
In a more recent study, Christine Schwartz observed that as “women’s labor force 
participation has grown, men may have begun to compete for high-earning women just as 
women have traditionally competed for high-earning men.”   She notes that as men and women 
both look for high earning mates, couples become more likely to marry others with similar 
earning power.52  Men are increasingly looking for women who will “pull their own weight” in 
marriage.  She shows further that the greatest changes occurred at the top; that is, the wives of 
the men with the greatest earnings showed the largest gains in overall income.  This is partly 
                                                            
47 ROSIN, THE END OF MEN, supra note 2, at 2. 
48  See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Conservative War on Single Mothers Like Jessica Schairer, Next 
New Deal (July 19, 2012), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/conservative-war-single-mothers-jessica-schairer. 
49 Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE 
CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).    
50See, e.g., Valerie Kincaide Oppenheimer, A Theory of Marriage Timing, 94 AM. J. SOC. 563 (1988) 
(arguing that women’s increased labor market participation has increased the importance of finding not just partners 
who are mutually attractive, but compatible career paths, increasing search costs). 
51 Christine R. Schwartz & Robert D. Mare, Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage from 1940 to 
2003, 42 Demography 621 (2005). 
52 Christine R. Schwartz, Earnings Inequality and the Changing Association between Spouses’ Earnings, 
115 AM. J. SOC. 1524 (2010).  
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because high earning men have become more likely to marry high earning women and partly 
because the women have become less likely to drop out of the labor market after marriage.53  In 
today’s competitive world, high earning men feel they need high earning partners to afford the 
good life in cities like New York, San Francisco, Chicago or D.C.54 
Completing the picture is a study from the Hamilton Project.  It shows that marriage rates 
have decreased for almost everyone – except the women at the highest income levels.  The chart 
showing the change is stunning.  For all men between the ages of 30 and 50, the percentage 
married has declined.  Even at the top, where income levels have increased substantially, the 
percentage of married men has fallen, albeit less than for other men. 55  For women in the top 5% 
of the income distribution, however, the percentage between the ages of 30 and 50 who are 
married has increased by over 10% while declining for every other group.56 .  High earning (and 
presumably high powered) women used to be a turnoff; now they are the prime catches in the 
marriage market.  And, because of competition within this narrow market, they are in the 
strongest of positions to “put a ring on it.”   
These figures bear out Guttentag and Secord’s prediction that as the ratio of men to 
women increases, so do women’s marriage rates.  As we indicated above, the gendered wage gap 
for college graduates has grown, and as it has, the number of high income men continues to 
outnumber the number of high income women, particularly among whites.   This group has held 
the line on non-marital births, seen its divorce rates fall, and the likelihood that a fourteen-year-
old will be living with both biological parents increase.57  Moreover, the group as a whole reports 
high rates of marital happiness and satisfaction.58   Paul Amato concludes that “[e]conomic 
security combined with gender equality appears to be a good recipe for ensuring marital 
success.”59  The highly sought after women with high incomes may not have gained as much as 
                                                            
53 Id. 
54 Steve Sailer, Value Voters, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Feb. 11, 2008), available at 
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59 PAUL R. AMATO, ALAN BOOTH, DAVID R. JOHNSON & STACY J. ROGERS, ALONE TOGETHER: HOW 
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the men in elite corporate boardrooms, but they have gained the most power of any group in 
setting the terms of continuing access to the bedroom. 
B.  The Disappearance of Marriage at the Bottom: Gender Distrust Magnified 
Rosin’s description of the women going it alone – rejecting marriage to the fathers of 
their children even if the men are willing – is a story of tough, competent women taking charge 
of their own lives.60   Rosin’s story is also one of male failure, of the men who will never be able 
to “drive up in a Chevy and take [their] rightful place at the head of the table.”61  The 
combination of the two, however, does not typically end with an adjustment of male and female 
roles into more flexible family arrangements.  The number of male full-time homemakers is still 
tiny.  Studies further indicate that as women earn more money, they do less housework, but only 
until the point where they contribute 51% of the family income – then they do more, perhaps to 
shore up their husbands’ fragile egos.62  The statisticians tell us that the husband’s loss of a high 
paying job together with the homemaker mom’s entry into the workplace to compensate is a 
prescription for divorce rather than the transformation of men into “mediocre house dudes.”63   
We have seen this story before and, in the end, it becomes a story of gender distrust rather than 
remade terms for companionship. 64 
In these terms, the most dramatic story in the United States is the story of the African-
American underclass.  Rosin doesn’t mention Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whose infamous report 
on the black family touched off a firestorm in 1965.  She does, however, repeat his claim that 
poor inner-city communities have become “matriarchies,” with “women making all the decisions 
and dictating what the men should and should not do.”65  We agree with Rosin that women’s 
power in society has increased with greater income.  Even the poorest women have seen an 
increase in income over the last thirty years compared to the men in their lives.66  And women 
are more independent, with greater ability to have children on their own and manage their own 
lives.67  This greater independence and societal power does give women greater ability to refuse 
to enter into or stay in relationships.  It does not, however, necessarily translate into the ability to 
dictate “what the men should and should not do” within relationships. 
Again, Guttentag and Secord provide an alternative perspective.  They argue that, given a 
particular level of societal power, gender ratios have a critical impact on the terms of 
                                                            
60 ROSIN, THE END OF MEN, supra note 2, at 2 (describing a single mother as “queen of her castle.”) 
61 Id. at 3, 4. 
62 See, e.g., Daniel Schneider, Market Earnings and Household Work: New Tests of Gender Performance 
Theory, 73 J. Marriage & Fam. 845 (2011). 
63 ROSIN, THE END OF MEN, supra note 2, at 71. 
64 Tony Dokoupil, Men Will Be Men, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/20/men-will-be-men.html. Newsweek reported that the American Time Use 
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66 Fry & Cohn, supra note 34, at 8. 
67 See ROSIN, THE END OF MEN, supra note 2, at 92 (quoting Edin, “I think something feminists have 
missed is how much power women have when they’re not bound by marriage.”). 
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relationships and that when the number of attractive men declines, the ability of women to enter 
into relationships on terms of their choosing declines.  To the extent men can easily enter into 
relationships with other women, women’s increased independence means more singles, not 
better (or at least more amenable) male behavior.  Guttentag and Secord examined, for example, 
the impact of sex ratios on African-American family patterns as a key chapter in their book.  
They looked at a variety of studies including one that linked family patterns to male availability 
and found that African-American single parent families varied from 2.9 percent in North Dakota 
where the sex ratio was 160 to 33 percent in New York where the sex ratio was 86.  They 
concluded that: 
. . . it is clear that the stability of black families has nothing to do with matriarchy 
or with any other social/cultural properties distinctive to blacks. Instead, it is a function of 
the sex ratio and of economic factors.  In high sex ratio states where black men are 
abundant and black women relatively scarce, family stability is marked.  Under these 
circumstances, black men make a long-term parental investment in their children, and 
illegitimate births, divorce and separation, and single-parent families headed by women 
are relatively low.68   
The studies on which Guttentag and Secord relied in the eighties were limited.  Since then, 
more sophisticated studies have found that the number of employed men had a more statistically 
significant effect than aggregate sex ratios.  The employment figures also explained more of the 
racial differences in marriage patterns than welfare availability or women’s employment (which at 
the margin had a positive effect on marriage rates.)69   In other words, women’s independence, 
through greater employment, did not depress marriage rates.  What did was the unavailability of 
“good” men. 
More recently, the Fragile Families Project has looked at the effect of mate availability on 
both the transition to marriage and relationship quality outside of marriage.  The Project studies 
unmarried women at the time they give birth and tracks the progress of their relationship with the 
father of the child afterwards.   The majority of the women in these studies have a relationship 
with the father at the time of the birth and many of the couples hope to marry eventually, although 
the majority will break up without doing so. In 2004, Kristin Hartnett and Sara McLanahan 
concluded that their “most striking finding” was that the supply of alternative partners has “a large 
influence on the parents’ decision whether to marry after a non-marital birth or not.”  In addition, 
given the significantly lesser availability of African-American men than men of other races, it also 
explained a large part of the racial differences in marriage rates.70  Indeed, the supply of 
alternative partners was a more powerful predictor of the likelihood of marriage than individual 
factors such as attitudes towards marriage or gender roles.  In addition, higher sex ratios correlate 
not just with marriage, but with relationship quality among cohabiting couples, measured by 
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factors such as the degree of conflict, paternal support for the mother and involvement with the 
children, and the likelihood that the man had fathered additional children with other women.71 
The change in the ratio of marriageable men to marriageable women does not just depress 
the marriage rates of the unemployed.  It is a rippling effect that affects the norms for everyone in 
a given relationship market.     As the number of black men whom black women were willing to 
marry, for example, declined in poor communities, the more desirable men found that they could 
play the field. 72  They did not need to commit to a relationship to gain sexual access to a woman 
or to have children with her.  The more attractive the man to a particular woman, often because of 
higher income or better employment prospects, the greater became his negotiating power.   And 
the fewer similar alternatives she had, the more “attractive” the employed man became.  So if 
greater unemployment reduces the number of men women regard as worthy partners, the greater 
the advantage of those men who are employed.  And, as Rick Banks has acknowledged,73 the ratio 
between African-American men with college degrees and female African-American college 
graduates is lower than the ratio for high school graduates, 74 increasing the bargaining power of 
male college graduates even more than for high school graduates.  The result is not an inevitable 
product of race or class differences.  Instead, it is the result of a change in the terms on which 
relationships are available, depressing the attractiveness of committed relationships – and 
exacerbating gender distrust.   
This analysis draws sharp distinctions between women’s societal power and independence 
versus women’s control of the relationships available to them.  Studies of marriage indicate that 
both women at the top and the bottom of society are more independent than they once were.  
Indeed, in an absolute sense, wealthier women have greater ability than poor women to forego 
marriage and raise children on their own.  Nonetheless, the women with the highest 
socioeconomic status also have the ability to participate in relationship markets where the supply 
of attractive men exceeds the supply of women.  Given the choice, they choose to marry and to 
marry men with relatively egalitarian attitudes about gender.75  Poorer women, in contrast, face a 
declining supply of attractive men, which increases the ability of the successful men in their 
communities to enjoy their access to multiple women without commitment and the ability of the 
less successful to enter into relationships with fewer contributions to the family’s well-being.  The 
women in these communities exercise their greater societal power and independence to forego 
committed relationships altogether.   
C.  The Fate of the Middle:  The Remade Terms of Family Life 
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Growing inequality in American society – and the disappearance of “good jobs” for blue 
collar men -- suggests that the middle of the socio-economic spectrum will increasingly resemble 
the bottom in terms of the ability of women to manage satisfying relationships.  Indeed, Rosin 
reports today that “[b]y nearly every important social measure, Middle America is starting to 
look like high-school-dropout America. “76   As we mentioned above, divorce rates for high 
school graduates resemble those of high school drops, while the divorce rates of college grads 
have plummeted. 77  Non-marital birth rates for the middle have skyrocketed while they have 
held steady at 2 percent for white college graduates.78  And as Guttentag and Secord would 
predict, as the percentage of employed men on the marriage market shrinks, norms shift away 
from committed relationships.   
When asked whether “marriage has not worked out for the people they know,” only 
seventeen percent of college graduates agreed, compared with forty percentage of those with only 
high school degrees and over half of high school dropouts.79  In the meantime, the percentage of 
women between the ages of 25 and 44 who report having had three or more sex partners over their 
lifetimes also changed.  It was about the same for all educational groups in 1995.  Since then the 
number has declined to fifty-seven percent for the most educated and risen to seventy percent for 
those in the middle.80  
While the studies of the white working class are not as detailed as the studies of poor 
minority communities, those studies that do exist refer to the same factors Rosin describes: the 
disappearance of stable male employment that pays a family wage and women’s increased 
workforce participation.81  These accounts are not nearly as triumphal, however, about the role of 
women.   They describe women struggling to hang onto family unfriendly positions when they 
would prefer to be home with their children.82  They describe laid-off men, who do not take up 
the slack at home, but engage in much greater rates of substance abuse and violence.  And they 
describe children falling farther behind their upper class peers.   
Paul Amato and his colleagues provide one of the best accounts.  Like Rosin, they 
examine the impact of women’s greater workforce participation, focusing in particular on 
married couples.  For most, the results are sanguine: women’s employment increases family 
financial security without disrupting marital stability.83   Nonetheless, the researchers found two 
distinct groups among working women.  The first were career women.  These women fit Rosin’s 
model well.  They expected to be in the labor market, held high-paying satisfying jobs, and 
associated employment with feelings of accomplishment.84  A second group of working wives, 
however, had entered the labor market to make ends meet.  They were more likely to be married 
to working class men, whose income had stagnated or whose job instability had increased.  
These women were much more likely to experience low job satisfaction, to feel that the jobs 
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interfered with their home life, and to prefer to work fewer hours.85  The working class women 
were also less likely to work in flexible positions or to be able to afford additional domestic 
help.86  For these women, their husband’s diminished prospects decreased their overall 
happiness, even if the additional income made them more independent.      
These accounts are consistent with Rosin’s.  The men suffer reverses and can’t cope.  The 
women, who now have the independence to kick the disappointing blokes out of the house, 
manage as best they can.  These women, however, are scrapping by rather than thriving.  And if 
the trends Rosin identifies persist, the women will face diminished opportunities for new 
relationships.  Passive underperforming men are one thing; alcoholic, abusive, unfaithful and 
unreliable men are another.  Guttentag and Secord suggest that as the number of marriageable 
men declines, women may gain greater independence, but not greater commitment.   
III. Reconstructing Community 
 
Rosin’s account ends with more women finding ways into the corner office and the 
slacker dude with whom she opened the book applying to nursing school.  She writes, “a new 
kind of alpha female has appeared, stirring up anxiety and, occasionally, fear . . .  In fact, the 
more women dominate, the more they behave, fittingly, like the dominant sex.”   We suspect, 
however, that if women were in fact to gain greater societal power, they would want more than 
individual success or more supportive domestic partners.  We believe that what they would want 
is a more equal society.  Wary of the traps of essentialization, we nonetheless note that while 
some women certainly want money and power and others want independence, women as a group 
are more likely than men as a group to prefer healthier and more egalitarian communities.  
 
In this account, we have emphasized the relationship between the growth of class-based 
inequality, and particularly greater income variance among men, and the so-called “rise of 
women.”   The rise in power of the overwhelmingly male one percent has set the terms for 
women’s rise, and we suspect on terms women would not choose if they enjoyed greater political 
and societal decision-making power.     
 
This rise in inequality in the United States has come with much greater emphasis on 
values women as a group do not share, such as hierarchy, lesser support for government 
generally, and, in particular, for regulations that promote health and safety, and for assistance for 
children,  the poor, and the unfortunate.  An agenda that truly reflected the rise of women would 
accordingly start with a more equal and just society. 
Consider women’s political loyalties.  If only women voted, Democrats would run the 
country and President Obama would win re-election in a landslide.   A recent Fox News poll, for 
example, found Obama leading Romney 53 to 39 percent among women while losing among 
men, 48 to 42 percent.87  Women are also significantly more likely to be Democrats than men 
                                                            
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 123-24. 
87 Markos Moulitsas, Women’s Support for Obama Grows, DAILY KOS (Sept. 14, 2012, 6:30 a.m.), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/14/1131657/-Women-support-for-Obama-grows. 
  18
(53 to 42%), a gender gap that dates back to at least 1990.88  For more than a decade, women 
have had a more favorable view of government action than men (45 to 36% in 2011).  Recent 
surveys find that higher percentages of women than men support greater government assistance 
for the poor (61% of women in comparison with 52% of men say that the government does not 
do enough), children (62 to  52%),  and the elderly (65 to 54%).89  Women also favored stronger 
government regulation of food production and packaging (61 to 45%), workplace safety and 
health (by 13 points) and in environmental protection (by nine points).90  
Political scientists indicate that, in fact, women’s worldviews differ substantially from 
men’s.  Men, for example, are likely to justify the existing system and to embrace a social 
dominance orientation that supports competition and hierarchy.91  Women in contrast tend to 
have more egalitarian attitudes, and egalitarians are more likely to favor support for 
disadvantaged groups, social welfare programs, and gun control.92 A woman’s agenda, that is, 
one supported more by women than men, would cut defense spending, increase taxes, provide 
more for the bottom, and strengthen communities and families.   
 
Instead, contemporary politics reflects the rise of the 1%, and the increasing political 
dominance of “angry white males.”93  The ensuing policies, which block further economic 
equality for women and blue collar men,94 in turn increase women’s dependence on access to 
male income at the top (even if higher female income is the way to get there) and marginalize the 
women in the middle and the bottom who are making it on their own.  The major threat to 
working class men is other men.  Middle class women have lost ground vis-à-vis more powerful 
men in terms of having their interests heard:  they have not gained in their ability to secure 
resources for their children,  fashion family flexible work environments or  good schools.  
Indeed, the lack of paid family leave and related benefits disproportionately disadvantages single 
parents – who remain overwhelmingly women. 
 
A true women’s agenda would therefore constrain hierarchy and limit the ability of the 
one percent to dictate national priorities.  It would focus on rebuilding community, and providing 
for those who would otherwise lose out.  We expect that such an agenda would devote greater 
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resources to education and children, focusing on ethical decisionmaking and obligation towards 
children, not promoting marriage as an end in itself or as a substitute for real solutions to 
poverty.   It would make workplaces more family friendly and families more central to national 
policy.  It would seek to include all of those who can contribute in the productive life of the 
nation.  It would create jobs, with particular attention to job stability, acknowledging the need for 
a social safety net that provides adequate health care and retirement security.   
 Perhaps most of all, such policies, in their efforts to limit the effects of greater 
inequality, would mark the rebirth of marginalized men.   
